Project info
Project consists of following studies
Cooperation in changing groups – dissertation Kasper Otten
Double standards in facilitating norm violations: A field experiment on attempted free-riding in public transport
Cooperation, punishment, and group change in multilevel public goods experiments
Human cooperation in changing groups: evidence from a large-scale public goods game
Cooperation between newcomers and incumbents: The role of normative disagreements
Description
We examine the conditions for the sustainability of public good provisions under changing group compositions, by specifying the role of social norm formation and social norm conflict. We mainly conduct lab experiments on variants of the public goods game.
Project start
01/09/2018
End date
31/12/2022
Behavioral theory
- Goals
- Identities
Researchers
Subjects
- Cooperation
- Newcomer
- Norm
- Normative Conflict
- Public good game
- Public good provision
- Social dilemma
- Sociology
Audience
- (Experimental) economics
- Psychology
- Social psychology
- Sociology
Work package
- Inclusion
- Synthesis
Sustainability threat
- External Shocks
Challenge
- Accommodating newcomers
Theoretical background
The sustainability of cooperation crucially depends on whether people are willing to invest in the provision of joint outcomes when the composition of the group changes over time, or when institutional arrangements shift. This is put to the test when newcomers enter the group, without being aware of what is expected of them. Maintaining cooperation under changing circumstances is particularly challenging when groups of people that initially might have different norms or incentives come together and have to produce public goods jointly. The aim of this project is to systematically examine the causal impact of key variables of interest on the continued provision of public goods.
Research design
The relations between model variables will be tested in variations of the public good game, a common paradigm for studying cooperation in groups. In one experiment, we manipulate the level of normative disagreement between newcomers and incumbents, in another experiment we manipulate whether newcomers and incumbents have the same incentives to contribute to a group-level and global-level public good. We also examine an existing online multiplayer game that incorporates a public goods game in its design. We finally aim to conduct a field experiment on how persons react to norm enforcement and how this depends on whether the norm enforces is a newcomer of incumbent.
Related sources
Funders
Name
Grant ID