Project info
Work package
- Inclusion
- Theory
Sustainability threat
- External Shocks
Challenge
- Accommodating newcomers
Study info
Description of Study
Norms can promote human cooperation to provide public goods. Yet, the potential of norms to promote cooperation may be limited to homogeneous groups in which all members benefit equally from the public good. Individual heterogeneity in the benefits of public good provision is commonly conjectured to bring about normative disagreements that harm cooperation. However, the role of these normative disagreements remains unclear because they are rarely directly measured or manipulated. In a laboratory experiment, we first measure participants’ views on the appropriate way to contribute to a public good with heterogeneous returns. We then use this information to sort people into groups that either agree or disagree on these views, thereby manipulating group-level disagreement on normative views. Participants subsequently make several incentivized contribution decisions in a public goods game with peer punishment. We find that although there are considerable disagreements about individual contribution levels in heterogeneous groups, these disagreements do not impede cooperation. While cooperation is maintained because low contributors are punished, participants do not use punishment to impose their normative views on others. the contribution levels at which groups cooperate strongly relate to the average normative views of these groups.
Study research question
To what extent does normative disagreement harm cooperation for the public good?
Collection provenance
- Collected during project
Collection methods
- Experiment
Personal data
No
External Source
Source description
File formats
- Excel
- Stata
- SPSS
Data types
- Structured
Languages
- English
Coverage start
Coverage end
22/10/2019
19/11/2019
Spatial coverage
Netherlands, Utrecht
Collection period start
22/10/2019
Collection period end
19/11/2019
Variables
Unit
Unit description
Sample size
Sampling method
Individuals
mostly students at Utrecht University
192
convenience sampling
Experimental Group
mostly students at Utrecht University
64
convenience sampling
Hypothesis
Theory
Groups in which the normative views are more homogeneous before entering the public good games obtain higher average levels of contributions than more heterogeneous groups.
Normative conflict theory
Variable type
Variable name
Variable description
Dependent variable
Contribution to the public good
Percentage of one's resources/endowment contributed to the public good(s)
Independent variable
Normative disagreement
Participants having different notions about how much to contribute to the public good
Discipline-specific operationalizations
Conflict of interest
None
Data packages
Normative Disagreement and Public Good Provision in (Changing) Groups
Data package DOI
10.24416/UU01-87KATL
Description
Prior studies suggest that cooperation in public good games with heterogeneous returns (benefits) is unstable and relatively low because participants disagree on the appropriate way to contribute, but the role of these normative views remains unclear because they are rarely directly measured or manipulated. We measure each participant's view on the appropriate way to contribute to the public good prior to play, and use this information to sort people into groups that either agree or disagree (two separate conditions) on how to contribute to the public good. We examine how this (dis)agreement affects contributions in a repeated public goods game with peer punishment. Furthermore, after a set of rounds, we remove one player from each group and exchange him/her for a member from another group. Each group thus receives a newcomer in place of an old-timer. The exchange is done such that the extent of normative agreement/disagreement after newcomer entry in the two conditions reverses: groups in the condition where members initially agree on normative views are due to the newcomer entry exposed to the disagreement that the groups in the other condition experienced before newcomer entry, and vice versa. We examine if, and how, newcomer entry affects cooperation in both conditions.
Accessibility
Open Access
Repository
Yoda Portal
User license
Retention period
50
Publications
Heterogeneous groups cooperate in public good problems despite normative disagreements about individual contribution levels
Otten, K., Buskens, V., Przepiorka, W. & Ellemers, N. Heterogeneous groups cooperate in public good problems despite normative disagreements about individual contribution levels. Sci. Rep. 1–12 (2020). doi:10.1038/s41598-020-73314-7
Documents
Filename
Description
Date
Ethics
Ethical assessment
Yes
Ethical committee
The Faculty Ethical Review Board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences at Utrecht University